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1. INTRODUCTION – THE CHALLENGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
FORM
Three simple but shocking facts demonstrate the depth of the corruption pro-
blem in Brazil: of the 65 members on the congressional commission that deliberated 
on President Dilma Rouseff’s impeachment, 37 faced corruption or criminal charges of 
their own; 303 of Brazil’s 513 congresspersons had been charged or were under inves-
tigation for serious crimes; and the same was true of 49 of the country’s 81 senators.1 
1 BEVINS, Vincent., The Politicians Voting to Impeach Brazil’s President are Accused of More Corruption than She is. Los An-
geles Times, Los Angeles, 28 mar. 2016. Available at:< http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-brazil-impeach-
20160328-story.html>.
Abstract
Corruption is a fact of public life in Brazil. Since the coun-
try’s transition to democracy, corruption has been a chal-
lenge for each presidential administration. The Brazilian 
judiciary has not escaped the corrupting influences in 
the region. One country whose challenges with judicial 
corruption are arguably even greater than Brazil’s is Alba-
nia, a country for which we were appointed to act as Con-
sultants to the Special Parliamentary Committee on the 
Reform of the Judicial System responsible for introduc-
ing major constitutional reforms aimed at curbing judi-
cial corruption. Those reforms to the Albanian Constitu-
tion entered into force in 2016. Too little time has elapsed 
since then to evaluate whether these reforms will fulfill 
their purposes. And certainly much too little time has 
passed for us to know whether the reforms in Albania can 
be applied with any confidence elsewhere in the world 
where similar problems with judicial corruption continue 
to undermine democratic norms of transparency and ac-
countability, namely in Brazil. We nonetheless believe it is 
useful to explain the Albanian constitutional reforms and 
to introduce them to readers in Brazil as available options 
for combating judicial corruption.
Keywords: Constitutional reform; Albania; Brazil; Judicia-
ry; corruption.
Resumo
A corrupção é um fato da vida pública no Brasil. Desde a 
transição do país para a democracia, a corrupção tem sido 
um desafio para cada administração presidencial. O Judi-
ciário brasileiro não escapou das influências corruptoras da 
região. Um país cujos desafios com a corrupção judicial são 
sem dúvida ainda maiores do que o Brasil é a Albânia, um 
país pelo qual fomos nomeados para atuar como Consulto-
res da Comissão Parlamentar Especial sobre a Reforma do 
Sistema Judicial responsável pela introdução de grandes 
reformas constitucionais destinadas a travar a corrupção 
judicial. Essas reformas à Constituição albanesa entraram 
em vigor em 2016. Pouco tempo se passou desde então 
para avaliar se essas reformas atenderão aos seus propósi-
tos. E certamente muito pouco tempo passou para que pos-
samos saber se as reformas na Albânia podem ser aplicadas 
com alguma confiança em outros lugares do mundo, onde 
problemas similares com a corrupção judicial continuam 
a prejudicar as normas democráticas de transparência e 
responsabilidade, nomeadamente no Brasil. No entanto, 
acreditamos que seja útil explicar as reformas constitucio-
nais albanesas e apresentá-las aos leitores no Brasil como 
opções disponíveis para combater a corrupção judicial.
Palavras-chave: Reforma constitucional; Albânia; Brasil; 
Poder Judiciário; corrupção.
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Constitutional reform in Brazil: lessons from Albania
Corruption is, as Timothy Power and Matthew Taylor have written, ‘a troubling constant 
in the Brazilian political system, with instances of corrupt behavior readily apparent at 
the federal, state, and municipal levels and across all branches of government’.2 This is 
not a recent phenomenon. Since the country’s transition to democracy, corruption has 
been a challenge for each presidential administration.3
The Brazilian judiciary has not escaped the corrupting influences in the region. 
A recent study has shown that courts in Brazil have been ineffective in combating cor-
ruption, finding that only 34 percent of all public officials dismissed in connection with 
corruption ever face criminal charges.4 And even where public officials are charged, 
Brazilian courts convict them for corruption at very low rates.5 Mariana Mota Prado and 
Lindsey Carson attribute these low conviction rates to plain error, onerous procedural 
rules and actual corruption inside the courts themselves.6 Publish trust in the Brazilian 
judiciary is unsurprisingly low. One public opinion poll found that 60 percent of Brazi-
lians have little or no confidence in their judges.7 There is no clear roadmap for how to 
curb corruption, especially judicial corruption, in Brazil. Prado and Carson diagnose the 
problem and hint at its intractability for political actors in search of a fix:
[T]he ultimate sanctioning authority in Brazil remains the judiciary, which possesses the 
power to review and overturn punishments imposed by other entities. As a result, Brazi-
lian courts hold a monopoly power over the sanctioning of corruption in the country.8 
Brazil is of course not the only country to confront the challenge of judicial cor-
ruption. One country whose challenges on this front are arguably even greater than 
Brazil’s is Albania, a former communist state that has struggled toward democracy since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Albania is a democratizing state with serious 
problems with judicial corruption.
2 POWER, Timothy J.; TAYLOR, Matthew M. Accountability institutions and political corruption in Brazil. Corruption and democracy 
in Brazil. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011. p. 1.
3 Ibid. p. 2-3.
4 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. OECD Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks for a 
Cleaner Public Service. OECD Public Governance Reviews (OECD Publishing 2, 2012). p. 86.
5 CARSON, Lindsey; PRADO, Mariana Mota. Brazilian anti-corruption legislation and its enforcement: Potential lessons for institu-
tional design. IRIBA Working Paper: 09. Manchester. UK, 2014. Available at: <http://www.brazil4africa.org/wp-content/uploads/
publications/working_papers/IRIBA_WP09_Brazilian_Anti-Corruption_Legislation_and_its_Enforcement.pdf>. p. 18.
6 Ibid.
7 OECD ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. OECD Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks 
for a Cleaner Public Service. OECD Public Governance Reviews (OECD Publishing 2, 2012). p. 87.
8 See CARSON, Lindsey; PRADO, Mariana Mota. Brazilian anti-corruption legislation and its enforcement: Potential lessons for 
institutional design. IRIBA Working Paper: 09. Manchester. UK, 2014. Available at: <http://www.brazil4africa.org/wp-content/
uploads/publications/working_papers/IRIBA_WP09_Brazilian_Anti-Corruption_Legislation_and_its_Enforcement.pdf>.
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In 2015, two of us were appointed by the Hon. Fatmir Xhafaj, in his capacity as 
Chairman of the Special Parliamentary Committee on the Reform of the Judicial System 
in Albania, to serve as Consultants to the Committee as it deliberated on major consti-
tutional reforms to the Albanian Constitution.9 In the Spring of 2015, we were invited to 
submit written testimony on the official report entitled ‘Analysis of the Justice System 
in Albania’ and later in the Fall of 2015, we were again invited to make written submis-
sions, this time delivered to the Office of the Technical Secretariat attached to the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Justice Reform on the ‘Draft Law on Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Albania.’
Political actors in Albania ultimately arrived at an agreement to pass sweeping 
constitutional reforms that dramatically altered the 1998 Constitution. The principal 
focus of the reforms was judicial corruption—how to spot it, how to stop it, and how 
to prevent its return. The reforms were adopted in July 2016 and entered into force in 
August 2016.10 Too little time has elapsed since then to evaluate whether these refor-
ms will fulfill their purposes. And certainly much too little time has passed for us to 
know whether the reforms in Albania can be applied with any confidence elsewhere 
in the world where similar problems with judicial corruption continue to undermine 
democratic norms of transparency and accountability, namely in Brazil. We nonetheless 
believe it is useful to explain the Albanian constitutional reforms and to introduce them 
to readers in Brazil as available options for combating judicial corruption.
The truth, however, is that any successful effort to curb judicial corruption in 
Brazil will require more than constitutional reform. For the same reason that an unde-
mocratic country could not become a democracy overnight simply by adopting the 
constitution and inferior laws of any given democracy, for instance Norway or Ireland, 
Brazil cannot rid itself of judicial corruption by adopting measures deployed in another 
country, with its distinct political culture and history. The challenge of curb corruption 
is therefore less of a challenge of constitutional reform than one of politico-cultural 
reform that requires deep democratization beyond metrics like voter turnout. 
We begin, in Part I, by exploring the problem of judicial corruption in Brazil. In 
Part II, we outline the problem of judicial corruption in Albania and, in Part III, we ex-
plain why and how Albanian political actors finally resolved to address this problem 
with a major constitutional reform in 2016. We conclude with thoughts on whether the 
Albanian reforms will be successful, and what its success or failure might mean for other 
countries in search of answers to corruption.
9 Judge Klodian Rado and Professor Richard Albert served separately as Consultants.
10 See Law 76/16, 22 July 2016, “On Some Amendments of the Law no 8417, 21 October 1998 on ‘The Constitution of Republic 
of Albania’ (Amended)”.
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2. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL
Brazil, unlike Albania, has never known communist rule. The country did, howe-
ver, live through a civil-military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, not unlike many other 
countries in Latin America in that era. During that period, democratic institutions and 
the rule became even more eroded that they had already been as a result of the poli-
tical and economic instability of the previous years.11 Corruption was widespread and 
exacerbated by the lack of institutional transparency and accountability. Since Brazil’s 
transition to a democratic constitution in 1988, institutional innovations and social im-
provements have helped generate relative political and economic stability.12 Brazil has 
strengthened the rule of law, the judiciary has become more independent and checks 
on the separate branches of government have become real constraints on the exerci-
se of their delegated powers, as a result of both institutional design and the creative 
energies of civil society.13 Courts in particular have taken the leading role in pulling the 
country toward transparency and the rule of law, in the process becoming a guarantor 
of horizontal accountability while at the same playing an increasingly central role in 
policy development.14
2.1.  An Overview
And yet corruption remains a serious challenge today in Brazil. Among other 
upper-middle-income economies,15 Brazil ranks particularly poorly, scoring only 40 on 
the Corruption Perceptions Index scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the highest 
levels of corruption.16 Although the recent Petrobras17 and Odebrecht18 scandals have 
affected the ranking, the reality is that Brazil had not fared much better in previous ye-
ars, scoring 42 in 2013, 43 in 2012 and 2014 and 38 in 2015.19 Despite the popularity of 
11 BARBOSA, Leonardo Augusto de Andrade. História Constitucional Brasileira: Mudança Constitucional, Autoritarismo e 
Democracia no Brasil Pós-1964. Brasília: Edições Câmara, 2012.
12 WEYLAND, K. The Growing Sustainability of Brazil’s Low-Quality Democracy. In: HAGOPIAN, Frances; MAINWARING, Scott P. 
(Ed.). The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks. Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 
90-94.
13 HAGOPIAN, Frances. Paradoxes of Democracy and Citizenship in Brazil. Latin American Research Review, v. 46, n. 3, p. 216-
227, 2011. p. 216-222; POWER, Timothy J.; TAYLOR, Matthew M. (Eds.). Corruption and Democracy in Brazil. Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2011. p. 4.
14 TAYLOR, Matthew M. Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reforms in Democratic Brazil. Stanford University Press, 2008. p. 223.
15 See World Bank Country and Lending Groups, online: <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/arti-
cles/906519>.
16 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Corruption Perception Index 2016. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/
news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016>.
17 See BEAUCHAMP, Zack. Brazil’s Petrobras Scandal, explained. Vox, 18 mar. 2016. Available at: <http://www.vox.
com/2016/3/18/11260924/petrobras-brazil>.
18 See GALLAS, Daniel. Brazil’s Odebrecht Corruption Scandal. BBC, 7 mar. 2017. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/bu-
siness-39194395>.
19 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Corruption Perception Index 2016. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/
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individual judges, the judiciary as an institution is itself perceived as less than trustwor-
thy, with only 29 percent of Brazilians expressing confidence in the judicial system.20 
2.2.  Two Types of Corruption
Two types of judicial corruption have revealed themselves in Brazil. We have 
seen ordinary corruption, meaning instances of bribery, embezzlement, influence ped-
dling, patronage and nepotism. There is a great deal of anecdotal and empirical data on 
these and other incidents of ordinary corruption. These practices are symptomatic of a 
more structural cause of corruption in Brazil, a country with a long history of clientelism 
and limited checks on the judiciary. The relationship between law and politics has been 
shaped by clientelism and lax oversight of the judiciary.21 To be sure, there has been 
some progress in reducing judicial corruption over the years but it has been minimal. 
Indeed, if the history of judicial corruption in Brazil proves anything it is that old habits 
die hard. Today, the judiciary remains an “eclectic mixture of judicial administration ba-
sed on manifest indistinctness between public and private spheres.”22 
In Brazil as in other democratizing states, the more deeply democracy takes 
root, the more difficult it becomes to carry out with much success the practices of or-
dinary corruption. It is here that the second type of corruption begins to gain ground. 
It is a more systemic and comprehensive form of corruption that is likewise “based on 
manifest indistinctness between public and private spheres.” Where ordinary corrup-
tion is defined by blatant breach of law, this more profound institutionalized corruption 
distorts the law and its democratic aspirations to shield itself from the external checks 
and norms required to curb corruption. Institutionalized corruption has complicated 
efforts to control it because its most powerful tool is the language of democracy: it 
commandeers principles like the separation of powers and judicial independence to 
strengthen judicial prerogatives and to shield the judiciary from intrusive oversight. 
We can trace the roots of modern judicial corruption in Brazil to the Constituent 
Assembly of 1987-88. The judiciary succeeded in keeping its pre-democracy structu-
res and functions virtually intact; there were few serious suggestions on reforming 
the judiciary.23 The new Constitution formally conferred substantial authority and 
news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016>.
20 See Fundação Getúlio Vargas – FGV. Relatório ICJ Brasil, 1º Semestre/2016. São Paulo: Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fun-
dação Getúlio Vargas (DIREITO GV), 2016. Available at: <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/17204/
Relatorio-ICJBrasil_1_sem_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
21 See ALMEIDA, Frederico Normanha Ribeiro de. A Nobreza Togada: As Elites Jurídicas e a Política da Justiça no Brasil. São 
Paulo, 2010. 329 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo.
22 SILVEIRA, Daniel Barile da. Patrimonialismo E Burocracia: Uma Análise Sobre O Poder Judiciário Na Formação Do Estado 
Brasileiro. Brasília, 2006. 302 f. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito do Estado, Universidade de 
Brasília. p. 20.
23 KOERNER, Andrei. O Debate sobre a Reforma Judiciária. Novos Estudos CEBRAP, São Paulo, v. 54, 1999. p. 12.
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independence to judges, enhanced the power and mechanisms of judicial review and 
entrenched new human rights—all liberal democratic features we would expect to see 
in the new charter of a nascent democratic state. But the reality is different: under the 
new Constitution, the judiciary—and particularly the Supreme Court—is functionally 
the same as it was under the civil-military dictatorship.24 Today, under the new Consti-
tution, the “old” judiciary exerts internal control on new judges and on their selection 
and promotion, as well as more generally on the administration of justice in the country.
The impetus at Brazil’s refounding to create democratic institutions resulted in 
vast powers for the judiciary. The Constitution makes courts practically untouchable 
in their administrative and financial autonomy,25 the result being that its operations, 
relationships and resources are shielded from much political oversight.26 With the cons-
titutionally-entrenched protection to conduct its affairs free from public view, the ju-
diciary under the constitutional design of 1988 could quite readily make substantial 
transfers of public resources to private benefit.27 The Constitution’s protections for an 
independent judiciary ensures that there is little outside knowledge about the court’s 
inner workings and deliberations on decisions involving the allocation of resources, 
promotion of judges and the administration of the trial calendar. Against this backdrop, 
efforts to increase transparency and accountability occasion strong resistance from 
judges’ associations on the argument that these efforts are a smokescreen to curtail 
judicial independence, to decrease the courts’ powers and to remove checks on the 
political branches.28
Even the law that governs the rules and procedures for a career as a judge is 
from the pre-democracy period.29 Enacted in 1979 during the military regime, the ju-
dicial career law proclaims judicial independence and creates rules that make it more 
than an empty declaration: judges enjoy life tenure, they are unremovable without 
cause and their remuneration cannot be reduced.30 The law also assures benefits for 
judges that exceed those given to any other category of career civil servant—benefits 
for which there are only internal mechanisms of control.31 The judicial career law fur-
thermore sets out judicial duties and ethical guidelines, and it also outlines prohibitions 
24 KOERNER, Andrei; FREITAS, Lígia Barros de. O Supremo na Constituinte e a Constituinte no Supremo. Lua Nova: Revista de 
cultura e política, São Paulo, n. 88, p. 141-184, 2013.
25 See Constitution of Brazil (1988). art. 99.
26 See Koerner (n 23) p.12.
27 See DA ROS, Luciano. O Custo da Justiça no Brasil: uma análise comparativa exploratória. Observatório de elites políticas e 
sociais do Brasil. NUSP/UFPR, v. 2, n. 9, p. 1-15, 2015. Available at: <http://observatory-elites.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
newsletter-Observatorio-v.-2-n.-9.pdf>.
28 VEJA SÃO PAULO. A Reação dos Marajás, 21 dec. 2016. Available at: <http://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/a-reacao-dos-marajas>.
29 BRASIL. Lei Complementar n. 35, de 14 de Março de 1979.
30 BRASIL. Lei Complementar n. 35, de 14 de Março de 1979, art 45, I. 
31 Ibid. at art 99.
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and accompanying administrative sanctions for their violation.32 However corruption 
cases have not yielded serious penalties for judges. A common administrative sanction 
has been forced retirement with the award of a proportionate wage based on years of 
service,33 for some perhaps more of a reward than a penalty. Although indictments on 
corruption also ordinarily entail criminal charges, judges are very rarely prosecuted to 
the full extent of the law. Not satisfied, in the last years, the judiciary has even proposed 
changes on the legislation to both expand their privileges and make even more difficult 
external checks on its activities.34 
2.3.  The Challenges Ahead
There have nonetheless been efforts to curb judicial corruption. The most sig-
nificant reform dates to 2004, when Brazilian Constitution was amended to create the 
National Council of Justice (CNJ).35 This new institution is now responsible for overse-
eing the judicial system and both setting and enforcing high standards of transparency 
and efficiency. The CNJ has established rules requiring all courts and councils to publish 
information about their financial and budgetary management, any public tenders, their 
pay structure, as well as instructions for how to access even more information.36 The 
CNJ has also undertaken to publish an annual report entitled Justiça em Números 
(“Justice in Numbers”), a new bank of data on judicial productivity, finance, human re-
sources, management and performance, in addition to evaluative analysis of bottle-
necks in the judicial process.37 Another equally important innovation is the Portal da 
Transparência (“Transparency Portal”), easily accessible on the internet, where anyone 
can find daily updates on judicial budgets, including revenues and expenditures.38 The 
role of CNJ is also investigative: it has examined allegations of fraud in connection with 
judicial selection and promotion, nepotism in court-related hiring, firing and advance-
ment, and judicial remuneration.39
Despite the high expectations it raised for fighting judicial corruption, the CNJ 
has quite frankly failed to live up to its promise of being offering effective oversight 
32 Ibid. at art 35-48.
33 Ibid. at arts 42, V.
34 See KADANUS, Kelly. Proposta de nova Loman aumenta benefício dos magistrados, Gazeta do Povo, Curitiba, 5 jul. 2015. 
Available at: <http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/vida-publica/justica-e-direito/proposta-de-nova-loman-aumenta-beneficios-
dos-magistrados-7davvag4n9gqi4688re0vboey>.
35 See BRASIL. Emenda Constitucional n 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004.
36 Resolução n 102 de 15 de dezembro de 2009; Resolução n 151, de 05 de julho de 2012; Resolução n 215 de 16 de dezembro 
de 2015.
37 CNJ. Justiça em Números 2016: Ano Base 2015. Brasília: CNJ, 2016. Available at: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/files/conteudo/
arquivo/2016/10/b8f46be3dbbff344931a933579915488.pdf>.
38 See Portal da Transparência, online: http://www.portaltransparencia.jus.br/despesas.
39 See CNJ. Informativo de Jurisprudência - Coletânea das Decisões Atualizadas do CNJ. Brasília: CNJ, 2014. Available at: 
<http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/informativo-jurisprudencia/InformativoJurisprudncia.abril2014.pdf>.
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of the judiciary. Perhaps the clearest reason for its failure is its composition: the CNJ is 
staffed predominantly by judges.40 Many of its members have led industry associations 
oriented toward defending the corporate interests of judges,41 and even those who 
are said to represent civil society are closely connected to the political leadership.42 
It should therefore come as no surprise that the CNJ has consistently ruled in favor of 
the corporate interests of the judiciary instead of using its resources and platform to 
curb recurring abuses in and around courts. There is another factor of note: the CNJ has 
no formal authority over the Supreme Court, leaving this body virtually unreviewable 
altogether. For all of its promise, then, the CNJ is neither designed nor administered in 
a way that would inspire confidence in its capacity to do what it was intended to do: to 
create and deploy strategies to foster much needed accountability and transparency of 
the country’s judicial system.
There is good news in this otherwise bleak portrait. Brazil has improved its me-
chanisms to counter or at least to address corruption, specifically judicial corruption. 
Although ordinary corruption still exists across the country, it is not the most difficult 
challenge. It is instead the more encompassing form of entrenched and systemic cor-
ruption that continues to do the most damage in the country. In order make any real 
progress in fighting this form of corruption, Brazil needs a broader of the very concept 
of judicial corruption in addition to a clearer understanding of how its manifestations 
spring from the judiciary’s capacity to innovative its own ways to insulate itself from 
external review while simultaneously expanding its authority. The great paradox of ju-
dicial corruption in Brazil is that democracy has brought greater formal accountability 
and transparency but it has also empowered the judiciary to exercise its institutional 
powers and prerogatives to defeat its functional ambition of reducing corruption.
3. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN ALBANIA
As bad as judicial corruption may be in Brazil, it is arguably worse in Albania. 
Political actors in the country have recently adopted a major package of constitutional 
reforms largely intended to curb judicial corruption. There are high expectations for 
the reforms but it remains too early to know whether they will succeed in ridding if 
not reducing incidents of corruption in courts. It is worth learning from the Albanian 
experience to see whether and how Brazil might benefit from the constitutional lessons 
Albania may have to share with the world.
40 Among its 15 members, two are chosen by the Brazilian Bar Association, one by the House of Representatives, and one by the 
Federal Senate. The other 11 members are either judges (9) or members of the Prosecutor’s Office (2).
41 See FRAGALE FILHO, Roberto. Conselho Nacional de Justiça: desenho institucional, construção de agenda e processo decisó-
rio. Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais, Rio de Janeiro, v. 56, n. 4, 2013. p. 981-983.
42 Ibid. p. 987.
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3.1.  Albanian Courts Before 2016
Prior to the constitutional reform of 2016, Albania’s judicial structure was a thre-
e-tiered system. Courts of first instance heard all types of cases—civil, criminal and 
administrative—with appellate courts hearing appeals directly from them. There were 
also courts dealing specifically with organized crime: a court of first instance and an 
Appeal Court of Serious Crimes. Finally, there was a High Court, the highest court in the 
hierarchy of the judicial structure. The High Court was divided into separate collegiums, 
each hearing appeals from appellate courts. Its jurisdiction was wide: it would hear 
corruption and criminal charges against the President, members of the executive and 
legislature, and judges of the High and Constitutional Courts. The High Court consisted 
of 17 judges appointed by the president with the consent of Parliament.43 
For its part, the Constitutional Court stood outside of this judicial structure. Its 
primary duty was to guard the Constitution. Consisting of nine judges appointed the 
same way as their High Court counterparts,44 the Constitutional Court’s responsibilities 
included judicial review of national and subnational laws as well as international agre-
ements. The Constitutional Court could also review the actions of the President and 
of parliamentarians.45 There was a High Council of Justice (HCJ), otherwise known as 
the ‘executive body of the judiciary’ because it was responsible for all evaluations and 
promotions of first instance and appellate court judges. Two-thirds of the HCJ was pro-
posed by the National Judicial Conference (NJC) and one-third earned its membership 
ex officio as representatives of the executive and legislature, namely the President, the 
chairman of the High Court, the Minister of Justice and three members elected by the 
Assembly. The NJC was known as the ‘parliament’ of judges; its members were selected 
in an election-like process and expected to defend the interests of the judges in the 
HCJ.46
Formally, the 1998 Albanian Constitution guaranteed judicial independence in 
terms of the administration of courts as well as their functions and financial security.47 
As to the judiciary’s administrative functions, the Albanian Constitution stated quite 
clearly that the selection, nomination and promotion of justices would be governed by 
independent institutions such as the HJC, the NJC and the School of Magistrates. Judges 
were recruited from among graduates of the School of Magistrates,48 an independent 
43 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). Art. 141.
44 Ibid. at art 124.
45 Ibid. at art 131.
46 Ibid. art. 147.
47 Ibid. arts 135-147.
48 The School of Magistrates is the only institution tasked with training future judges and prosecutors in Albania. To become 
a judge or prosecutor in Albania, persons must first be admitted to the School, which requires a bachelor of laws earned with 
distinction as well as a passing grade on a test given by the School. After acceptance to the School, admittees must complete a 
three-year full-time intensive theoretical and practical education in law in order to become a judge or prosecutor.
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institution governed by a group of roughly 15 representatives from all corners of the le-
gal community, only two of which were appointed by the Ministry of Justice.49 The HCJ 
was entitled to recruit ten percent of the total number of judges among former judges 
who had not graduated from the School of Magistrates, assuming the fulfilled the eli-
gibility requirements.50 Under this judicial structure, judges could neither be tried nor 
prosecuted criminally without approval from the HCJ.51 This package of safeguards was 
seen as the guarantor judicial immunity.
3.2.  An Overview of Judicial Corruption
Studies from 2012 and 2014 show that courts in Albania are widely perceived to 
be the most corrupt public institution in the country.52 The reason why surely includes 
a troubling lack of judicial independence and the widespread practice of bribery in the 
judiciary.53 Judicial corruption has been a significant challenge in Albania’s transition 
from communism to democracy since 1990, after 45 years of communism. Political ac-
tors purported to build democratic institutions—particularly during an intense period 
of institution-building between 1992 and 1998—but the executive branch sought with 
great success to control courts through both formal and informal strategies. Albania’s 
low ranking on rule of law and transparency indicators reflects their success: Albania 
once had the worst rule of law ranking in the Western Balkans,54 and it was only re-
cently in 2016 that Albania moved from 110th to 83rd in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index.55 We should not be surprised that judicial independence 
in Albania has declined in recent years.56 The point is clear, according to the European 
Commission: ‘corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious 
problem’.57 
49 See Law no 8136, 31 July 1996 (amended by Law no 9414, dated 20 May 2005), “On the Magistrate School of the Republic of 
Albania”, art 6. 
50 See Law no 9978, 18 February 2008, “On the Organization of Judicial Power in the Republic of Albania”, art 11.
51 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). art 137. 
52 See SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRITY. 2014 Report of South East European Le-
adership for Development and Integrity (SELDI): Anti-Corruption Reloaded: Assessment of South East Europe. Available 
at:<http://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/RAR/SELDI_RAR.pdf>. p. 83; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Corrup-
tion Perception Index 2013. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report>.
53 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT. Albania 2015 Progress Report. Available at: < https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood
-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_albania.pdf>.
54 In a 2011 Freedom House report, Albania’s judicial framework and independence fared worse than Montenegro and Mace-
donia, tied Croatia and Bosnia, yet performed better than Serbia and Kosovo. See Freedom House. Nation in Transit 2011. 
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/NIT-2011-Release_Booklet.pdf>.
55 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Corruption Perception Index 2016. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/
news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016>.
56 See Freedom House. Nation in Transit 2016: Albania. p. 8. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
NiT2016%20Albania_1.pdf>. 
57 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT. Albania 2016 Progress Report. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood
-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_albania.pdf>.
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3.3.  Piecemeal Efforts to Combat Judicial Corruption
Prior to the major constitutional reforms of 2016, Albania took modest steps to 
curb judicial corruption. The Code of Judicial Ethics, introduced in 2000, has had vir-
tually no impact.58 Parliament passed a new law on judicial power in 2008 in order to 
strengthen judicial independence but courts did not become truly independent.59 Par-
liament also passed a law on conflicts of interest for public officials, including judges.60 
Yet the European Commission found this law wanting, noting that ‘the law on conflicts 
of interest needs to be further clarified’.61 Parliament thereafter revised the law in 2012 
by strengthening the investigatory powers of the High Inspectorate for Declaration and 
Audit of Assets. In addition, six Joint Investigative Units (JIUs) were created to monitor 
economic crimes and corruption but they ‘have inadequate human resources and tech-
nical equipment, as do most investigation and law enforcement agencies’.62 
From 2012-14, the Ministry of Justice undertook several reforms of its own. The 
most significant was lifting judicial immunity.63 Even still, there were no cases of suc-
cessful prosecution of judges after their immunity was lifted. The Ministry of Justice, 
together with the HCJ, opened hotlines for citizens to file claims of corruption. Whis-
tle-blower protections were enhanced, and Parliament created a specialized anti-cor-
ruption body to increase transparency.64 These and other reforms seem to have had 
little effect on Albanians’ perception of the judiciary, as judges are regarded as the most 
corrupt public officials,65 and bribes continued to be paid in exchange for favorable 
decisions from prosecutors and judges.66 
There are grave consequences to the massive scale of judicial corruption in Al-
bania. It was one reason for postponing Albania’s request for accession to the European 
Union. Stefan Fule, the EU’s Enlargement Commissioner, declared in no uncertain terms 
in 2013 that ‘there are five key priorities which stand between Albania and accession talks: 
58 Ibid. p. 57. 
59 See Law no 9978, dated 18 February 2008, “On the Organization of Judicial Power in the Republic of Albania”. 
60 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT. Albania 2007 Progress Report. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood
-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/albania_progress_reports_en.pdf>.
61 Ibid.
62 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT. Albania 2012 Progress Report. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood
-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/al_rapport_2012_en.pdf>.
63 See FREEDOM HOUSE REPORT. Nations in Transit, Albania 2013. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
transit/2013/albania>.
64 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 57, p. 17.
65 See ALBANIAN CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH (ACER); SOUTH-EAST EUROPE LEADERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT AND IN-
TEGRITY (SELDI). Corruption Assessment Report: Albania. Available at: <http://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/
CAR_Albania_2016/Raporti_i_Vleresimit_te_Korrupsionit_2016.pdf>. p. 3.
66 See GAN BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL. Albania Corruption Report 2016. Available at: <http://www.business-anti-
corruption.com/country-profiles/albania>. 
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corruption, organised crime, judiciary, administrative reform, human rights’.67 The next 
year, the Council of Europe released a report on judicial corruption in Albania that hi-
ghlighted concerns about ‘the reportedly high level of corruption in the judiciary which 
seriously impedes the proper functioning of the justice system and undermines public 
trust in justice and the rule of law in Albania’.68 Albanians—and Albanian judges and pro-
secutors in particular—agreed that serious changes were necessary to finally do some-
thing about the pervasive corruption in courts. In 2014, over 90 percent of judges and 
prosecutors called for judicial reforms on a constitutional level to address this problem.69 
4. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN ALBANIA
Just last year in 2016 Parliament passed a major constitutional reform to address 
judicial corruption among other challenges facing public institutions.70 The constitu-
tional reform altered about one-third of the Albanian Constitution,71 amending all exis-
ting judicial institutions and establishing new ones, resulting in significant changes to 
the judiciary and prosecution. With the support of the European Assistance Mission to 
the Albanian Justice System, the reform process began with a comprehensive analysis 
of the justice system, a detailed draft of a strategy and an action plan, and consultations 
with national and international experts.72 A package of amendments was introduced in 
Parliament and thereafter approved; Albania is now endeavoring to implement the far
-reaching judicial reforms. The reforms seek to address judicial corruption in three ways: 
by reforming existing judicial institutions, establishing new ones and vetting judges 
and prosecutors at all levels, including justices of the Constitutional Court.
4.1.  Reforming Existing Judicial Institutions
Very little about the judiciary was left untouched by the 2016 constitutional re-
forms. The Constitutional Court, the High Court, the High Council of Justice and ordi-
nary courts — all were affected by the reforms. 
67 FOX, Benjamin. Commission Backs Albania-EU Membership Talk. EU Observer.com, 16 oct. 2013. Available at: <https://euob-
server.com/enlargement/121805>.
68 See MUIŽNIEKS, Nils. Report Following Visit to Albania. p. 1. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdo-
cs/2009_2014/documents/dsee/dv/07/07en.pdf>.
69 See OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION OF ALBANIA. Survey: Judges and Prosecutors on Constitutional Reforms. Bulletin no 3, 
July-September 2014. Available at: <https://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/press_03_law_bulletin.pdf>.
70 See Law 76/16, 22 July 2016, “On Some Amendments of the Law no 8417, 21 October 1998” on “The Constitution of Republic 
of Albania (Amended)”.
71 Prior to the final Amendments, the Albanian Constitution had 174 articles. The reform introduced 47 articles that amended 
articles in the pre-reform constitution and also introduced completely new articles. In addition, a relatively long Appendix of an 
additional 10 articles was appended to the pre-reform constitution. See Law 76/16, 22 July 2016, “On Some Amendments of the 
Law no 8417, 21 October 1998 on ‘The Constitution of Republic of Albania’ (Amended)”.
72 See EURALIUS – The European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System. Justice Reform. Available at: <http://www.
euralius.eu/en/library/justice-reform>. 
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As to the Constitutional Court, the reforms clarified its exclusive constitutional 
jurisdiction and enhancing its autonomy as to finance and administration.73 Further-
more, the Constitutional Court’s composition was changed; formerly composed of nine 
members appointed by the President with the consent of Parliament,74 the Court is 
now composed of three members appointed by the President, three elected by the 
Parliament and three elected by the High Court.75 The reforms also seek to thwart poli-
tical favoritism, creating a new Justice Appointments Council to generate what aspires 
to be a meritocratic ranking of candidates for judgeship—a ranking that must not only 
be consulted but also honored when political actors appointment decisions.76 All new 
appointees must be ranked among the Council’s top three candidates.77 One of the 
most important reforms to the Court is a change to Article 126, which used to read 
that “a judge of the Constitutional Court cannot be criminally prosecuted without the 
consent of the Constitutional Court”.78 Now, Article 126 states that “the Constitutional 
Court judge shall enjoy immunity in connection with the opinions expressed and the 
decisions made in the course of assuming the functions, except where the judge acts 
based upon personal interests or malice”.79 The exception based on ‘personal interests’ 
and ‘malice’ makes it possible to investigate Constitutional Court judges for corruption 
where the circumstances warrant. 
The High Court, for its part, no longer has original jurisdiction to adjudicate 
criminal charges against the President, the Prime Minister, members of the Council of 
Ministers, parliamentarians and judges of the High Court and Constitutional Court.80 
That power has been transferred to specialized courts.81 Prior to the reforms, the Pre-
sident, with the consent of Parliament, appointed members of the High Court.82 Now 
its members are appointed for a non-renewable nine-year term by the President on 
the recommendation of the High Judicial Council.83 This strictly limited term helps to 
avoid possible corruption in the nomination process. There is an important restriction 
73 Constitution of Albania, art 124(2)(3) (as amended).
74 Ibid. p. art 125 (pre-amendment).
75 Ibid. p. art 125(1) (as amended).
76 Unlike the pre-amendment Constitution that allowed the Parliament to select Constitutional Court judges by a simple majo-
rity of all 140 MPs, now the Parliament ‘shall appoint the Constitutional Court judges by three-fifth majority of its members’. See 
ibid. p. art 125(2) (as amended), which also stipulates that in the interest of meritocracy, if the Parliament ‘fails to appoint the 
judges, within 30 days of the submission of the list of candidates by the Justice Appointment Council, the first ranked candidate 
shall be deemed appointed’.
77 The Justice Appointments Council is a new constitutional institution that was created in the judicial reform. See ibid. at art 
149(d) (as amended); ibid. at art 125(1).
78 Ibid. at art 125 (pre-amendment).
79 Ibid. at art 126 (as amended) [emphasis added].
80 Ibid. at art 141(1) (pre-amendment).
81 Ibid. at art 135(2) (as amended).
82 Ibid. at art 136.
83 Ibid. at art 136(1).
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on eligibility for appointment: High Court judges are to be selected from those judges 
who have at least 13 years of experience as judges.84
The reforms have also renamed the High Council of Justice to the High Judi-
cial Council (HJC).85 This institution is seen in Albanian scholarship and jurisprudence 
as “the government of the judiciary”.86 Its main role is to “ensure the independence, 
accountability and appropriate functionality of the judicial power in the Republic of 
Albania”.87 Only six of its 11 members are judges;88 the other five must have high moral 
and professional integrity, and at least 15 years of professional experience.89 Of these 
five laypersons, “two lay members shall be elected from the advocates, two from the 
corps of law professors and the School of Magistrates and one shall be from civil socie-
ty”.90 Prior to the reforms, nearly all judges on the HJC promoted themselves to higher 
positions in the judiciary, despite the obvious conflict of interest.91 Now, no judges on 
the HJC can be promoted during their period of service on members of the HJC. And to 
further depoliticize the HJC, the President and Minister of Justice no longer have seats 
on the Council. The HJC now oversees the justices of the High Court and it is itself over-
seen by the Constitutional Court, which can suspend or altogether dismiss any member 
of the HJC.92
Moreover, the 2016 constitutional reforms now require all judges to graduate 
from the School of Magistrates.93 All judges must also survive an investigation into their 
personal assets and background before any appointment.94 The purpose here is to dis-
qualify those whose backgrounds raise questions about their integrity and likelihood 
to support the values of transparency and the public interest underlying the constitu-
tional reforms. Another point is worth highlighting: prior to the reforms, judges served 
for life (with the exception of Constitutional and High Court judges), and neither their 
84 Ibid. at art 136(3). Yet according to this article one-fifth of the judges may be selected from among those renowned jurists with 
no fewer than 15 years of experience as advocates, law professors or lecturers, senior employees in the public administration 
or in some other practice of law.
85 Ibid. at art 147.
86 See SUBASHI, Armando. ‘Te Merren Masa ndaj KLD’. Vizion Plus, 26 nov. 2016, available at: <http://www.dailymotion.com/
video/x3fng0a_te-merren-masa-ndaj-kld-news-lajme-vizion-plus_tv>.
87 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). Art 147(1) (as amended). For a more detailed list of its constitutional responsibilities, 
see ibid. at art 147(a)(1) (as amended).
88 See ibid. at art 147 (as amended).
89 Ibid. at art 147(3) (as amended).
90 Ibid. at art 147(4). 
91 In the period 1998-2004 almost all judge-members of the High Council of Justice elevated themselves within the judiciary. 
See RADO, Klodian. Prohibiting Conflicts of Interest within the High Council of Justice. Shekulli, n. 203, 26 jul. 2004 p. 4. This 
practice continued after 2004 until just before the constitutional changes. See: The Scandal, How Two Married Partners in HCJ 
Were Promoted, Panorama, Tirane, 17 dec. 2016. Available at: <http://www.panorama.com.al/skandali-si-u-promovuan-dy
-bashkeshortet-e-kld-se>.
92 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). Art 147(c) (as amended).
93 For more information on the School of Magistrates of Albania, see online: <http://www.magjistratura.edu.al/?lang=2#55>.
94 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). Art 136(a) (as amended).
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pay nor benefits could be reduced.95 The reforms now say nothing about judicial tenure 
and they permit changes to salary and benefits in some instances.96
4.2.  Creating New Institutions
In addition to reforming exiting institutions, the 2016 constitutional reforms to 
combat judicial corruption created several new permanent judicial institutions to help 
achieve this goal.
The office of the High Justice Inspector (HJI) was established to fight corruption 
and increase external accountability of judges at all levels. Article 147(d) of the amen-
ded Constitution states that ‘the High Justice Inspector shall be responsible for the ve-
rification of complaints against judges and prosecutors of all levels, members of the 
High Judicial Council, High Prosecutorial Council and Prosecutor General,’ and specifies 
that the HJI ‘shall also be responsible for inspecting the courts and prosecution offices 
as institutions.’97 To reinforce external checks and to establish its impartiality, election 
to the HJI, for a single nine-year non-renewable term, requires a three-fifths vote in Par-
liament.98 Its members can be disciplined and dismissed by the Constitutional Court.99 
The HJI does not on its own have the authority to dismiss or suspend judges and pro-
secutors. The only institution that has this authority of judges, with the exception of 
Constitutional Court judges, is the High Judicial Council.100
As previously mentioned, the Justice Appointments Council (JAC) is another 
new institution created in 2016. Its purpose is to establish a more meritocratic pro-
cess for appointment. Composed of nine members selected by lot from the ranks of 
judges and prosecutors who are not involved in any disciplinary proceeding, the JAC’s 
members serve a one-year term.101 The JAC’s role is to verify that candidates for the 
Constitutional Court and the High Justice Inspector position fulfill legal requirements 
for appointment as well as the equally important professional and moral criteria of 
competence and high character.102 The JAC ranks candidates in an advisory ordering, 
though the ranking becomes binding where Parliament fails to reach a majority on a 
given appointment, in which case the candidate at the top of the JAC’s list is deemed 
appointed to fill the given vacancy.103 The reforms also establish external checks and 
95 Ibid. at art 138 (pre-amendments).
96 See ibid. at art 138 (as amended).
97 Ibid. at art 147(d)(1)(2).
98 Ibid. at art 147(d)(3).
99 Ibid. at art 147(e).
100 Ibid. at art 147.
101 Ibid. at art 149(d).
102 Ibid. at art 149(d)(1).
103 Ibid.
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balancing on the JAC, including the appointment of an ombudsperson to observe the 
selection by lot of members of the JAC as well as its meetings and official business.104 
The 2016 constitutional reforms to combat corruption also yield new speciali-
zed courts to deal with corruption at the highest ranks of the judiciary, the legislature 
and the executive, including the President.105 The judges on these specialized courts 
are appointed by the HJC but they may be removed only with a two-thirds vote of 
the HJC. Judges on these specialized courts have significant powers but they must still 
pass an investigation into their professor and personal background: ‘The candidates for 
judges and judicial civil servant in the specialized courts, as well as their close family 
members, prior to their appointment, must successfully pass a review of their assets 
and their background and shall consent to periodic reviews of their financial accounts 
and personal telecommunications, in accordance with the law’.106 
4.3.  Transitional Vetting
A necessary first step in the implementation of these far-reaching Albanian ju-
dicial reforms is to establish a general vetting process for judges and prosecutors at 
all levels, including justices of the Constitutional Court.107 Accordingly, a number of 
temporary institutions and procedures were established in connection with the 2016 
judicial reform; they will expire at the completion of vetting process, which is scheduled 
to be completed within 9 years.108 
One of the most controversial features of the Albanian judicial reform is the cou-
ntry’s reliance on external actors—the International Monitoring Operation (‘IMO’)—not 
only in the actual drafting of the reforms but also in their implementation.109 The Inter-
national Monitoring Operation will run for nine years. Its main role is to appoint Inter-
national Observers to help establish vetting institutions, to monitor their activity, and 
to give recommendations.110
Two of the vetting bodies are the Independent Commission of Evaluation (ICE) 
and the Appeal Chamber (AC). All judges and prosecutors must undergo assessments 
104 Ibid. at art 149(d)(3).
105 Ibid. at art 135(2) (as amended).
106 Ibid. at art 135(4).
107 See ZHILLA, Fabian. Keshilli i Emerimeve ne Drejtesi, Skandali Antikushtetues. Panorama, 2 feb. 2017. Available at: <http://
www.panorama.com.al/keshilli-i-emerimeve-ne-drejtesi-skandali-antikushtetues>.
108 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). Arts 178-83 (as amended). 
109 Ibid. at Annex art. B, ‘International Monitoring Operation’ (as amended).
110 Ibid.
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of their assets,111 background,112 and proficiency.113 These assessments are external 
procedures conducted first by ICE and then by the AC, and each is supported and mo-
nitored by the IMO.114 In order to avoid conflicts, no member of ICE or the AC may have 
been a judge, prosecutor, legal advisor or legal assistant in the two years prior to their 
nomination to serve on either body.115 Both institutions, ICE and AC, are court-like bo-
dies. Under Article 179(b)(6), each of these two bodies operates independently of the 
other. ICE members have the equivalent status of a High Court judge,116 and members 
of the AC sit within the Constitutional Court as an independent branch117 and have 
the status of Constitutional Court judges.118 ICE consists of four permanent first-instan-
ce panels of three members each,119 whereas AC consists of seven judges that decide 
matters in five-judge panels.120 Under the supervision and recommendations of the 
International Observers, ICE and the AC possess the exclusive constitutional compe-
tence to suspend or dismiss any judge sitting on any court in Albania, including the 
Constitutional Court, as well as any prosecutors, including the General Prosecutor.121 As 
a safeguard, the 2016 constitutional reforms have also created two Public Commissio-
ners who ‘shall represent the public interest and may appeal the decision of the Com-
mission’.122 In addition, consistent with the expectations of the Council of Europe and 
the European Union, the Albanian Constitution now recognizes the right of suspended 
or dismissed judges and prosecutors to appeal their sanction to the European Court of 
Human Rights.123
5. CONCLUSION — AN ALBANIAN STRATEGY FOR BRAZIL?
Since the Albanian constitutional reforms have only recently come into force it 
is too early to predict with any reliability whether they will succeed in achieving their 
high ambitions. Yet even at this early stage, a few doubts about their successful imple-
mentation have arisen.
111 Ibid. at Annex art D.
112 Ibid. at Annex art DH. 
113 Ibid. at Annex arts E.
114 Ibid. at Annex art B(1)(2).
115 Ibid. at Annex art C(5), ‘General provisions for the Commission and Appeal Chamber’.
116 Ibid. at Annex art C(3).
117 Ibid. at art 179(b)(5). See Constitutional Court of Albania. Decision V-2/17, p. 60. Available at: <http://www.gjk.gov.al/templa-
tes/NEModules/kerkese_list/konsulto.php?id_kerkesa_vendimi=2376&language=Lng1>.
118 ALBANIA. Constitution of Albania (1998). Annex art C(3) (as amended).
119 Ibid. at Annex art C(1), ‘General provisions for the Commission and Appeal Chamber’ (as amended).
120 Ibid. at Annex art F(1), ‘Appeal Chamber’.
121 Ibid. at Annex art Ë, ‘Disciplinary Measures’; ibid. at Annex art F, ‘Appeal Chamber’.
122 Ibid. at Annex art C(2), ‘General provisions for the Commission and Appeal Chamber’.
123 Ibid. at Annex art F(8), ‘Appeal Chamber’.
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Perhaps the biggest challenge is determine who will judge the constitutiona-
lity of the new laws passed pursuant to the constitutional reform. This is a concern 
because the justices of the Constitutional Court are themselves subject to the vetting 
process. The question was put directly to the Constitutional Court. The Court pru-
dently decided to request an amicus curiae brief from the Venice Commission.124 The 
Commission concluded that these were ‘extraordinary circumstances’, and that the 
principle of necessity dictated that the Court should adjudicate the constitutionality 
of the Vetting Law despite its conflict of interest.125 The Albanian Constitutional Court 
ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the Vetting Law.126 And yet the vetting ins-
titutions themselves may in some cases be staffed by professionals who were part of 
the previous communist regime,127 insofar the reforms require that persons appoin-
ted to these vetting bodies have previously served no fewer than fifteen years in a 
high office of law or public administration.128 This is a difficult problem that attends 
to countries in transition.129
The constitutional reforms must also overcome resistance from judges and 
prosecutors, many of whom oppose the new vetting process. Immediately after the 
reforms entered into force, the national associations of judges and prosecutors objec-
ted to the vetting process,130 and one of the judges’ associations joined forces with 
the opposition party to initiate a constitutional challenge to the Vetting Law.131 This 
is a significant obstacle standing in the way of real reform. Although these sweeping 
constitutional reforms had been adopted by a unanimous vote,132 there was and re-
124 See ibid. at para 14. The Venice Commission, formally known as The European Commission for Democracy through Law, is the 
Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters. The President of the Albanian Constitutional Court had requested, 
in a letter dated 28 October 2016, an amicus curiae brief from the Venice Commission on whether Law no 24/2016 on the 
“Transitional Re-Evaluation of judges and Prosecutors in the Republic of Albania” (“the Vetting Law”) conformed to international 
standards, including those reflected in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
125 See Venice Commission, 109th Plenary Session, 9-10 December 2016, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court 
on the Law on the Transitional Re-evaluation of Judges and Prosecutors (The Vetting Law), CDL-AD(2016)036-e, availa-
ble at: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)036-e >. The amicus curiae brief stated that “the 
disqualification of the constitutional judges because of the existence of a conflict of interest would result in the total exclusion 
of the possibility of judicial review of the Vetting Law in view of its conformity to the Constitution. This would undermine the 
guarantees ensured by a functioning judicial review of legislation. This situation could be considered by the Constitutional 
Court as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ which may require departure from the principle of disqualification in order to prevent 
denial of justice”. Ibid. p. 61.
126 See Decision V-2/17, supra note 117.
127 Ibid. at Annex art C(5), ‘General provisions for the Commission and Appeal Chamber’.
128 Ibid. at Annex art C(3), ‘General provisions for the Commission and Appeal Chamber’.
129 ZHILLA, Fabian. Procesi i “Vetting”-ut rrezikon te “ngrije”. Panorama, 7 feb. 2017. Available at: <http://www.panorama.com.
al/procesi-i-vetting-ut-rrezikon-te-ngrije>.
130 See Vettingu ‘bashkon’ gjyqtarët me PD, Unioni: Palë në Kushtetuese. Tirane: Top Channel, 24 oct. 2016. Available at: 
<http://top-channel.tv/lajme/artikull.php?id=338697>; Unioni i Gjyqtareve, Gati Ankimimi i Dyte ne Kushtetuese, Tirane: 
Klan, 30 nov. 2016. Available at: <http://tvklan.al/unioni-i-gjyqtareve-gati-ankimimi-i-dyte-ne-kushtetuese>.
131 See Decision V-2/17, supra note 117.
132 See Parliamenti Shqiptar Voton me 140 Vota Reformen ne Drejtesi. Tirane: Radio Televizioni Shqiptar, 22 jul. 2016. Avai-
lable at: <http://rtsh.al/lajme/parlamenti-shqiptar-miraton-me-140-vota-reformen-ne-drejtesi>.
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mains pressure from political parties to keep their own judges in place without the 
careful vetting that the new reforms require—and also to appoint their own to the 
vetting bodies.
The role of International Monitoring Operation is therefore critical to the suc-
cess of the constitutional reforms. The problem, however, is that its intrusive role in 
Albanian constitutional law and politics could be seen as undermining national sove-
reignty. Its role is different from the one played by Council of Europe and the European 
Union in Albania’s constitutional reform: both of these international institutions were 
very involved in advising Albanian political actors during the drafting and adoption 
of the reforms. Their involvement was not without reason—Albania has an interest in 
demonstrating its willingness to meet their expectations because Albania is currently a 
candidate country for accession to the Union.133 However the International Monitoring 
Operation will have oversight authority over the implementation of the reforms. How 
can a nation be sovereign if it subjects its internal procedures to external oversight? 
This, at least, is a collateral criticism raised by those opposed to the reforms. The Venice 
Commission has concluded that the involvement of these foreign actors—importantly 
with the consent of Albanian political actors—does not trample upon principles of na-
tional sovereignty.134 
And so we are left with more questions than answers not only as to whether the 
reforms will succeed in Albania, but whether they suggest a way forward to curb judi-
cial corruption in Brazil. One question, for Brazil, is whether political actors might accept 
advice from abroad to design strategies to combat judicial corruption and then, once 
adopted, to help enforce them. There are some possibilities for regional multi-lateral 
organizations that might play a role in Brazil similar to the one played by the Council 
of Europe, the European Union and now the International Monitoring Operation. One 
possibility is the Organization of American States (OAS) which incidentally held a cere-
mony recently in March 2017 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the ratification of the 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption.135 If any external body can be seen as a 
legitimate actor in Brazilian domestic law and politics, it could well be the OAS.
133 Albania became the 35th member state of the Council of Europe on 13 July 1995. See Council of Europe, “Albania– 47 States, 
One Europe”, online: <http://www.coe.int/ca/web/portal/albania>. Albania has been an official candidate country for accession 
to the European Union since 24 June 2014. One of the requirements for eventual full membership in the Union is the harmo-
nization of national laws with EU treaties, regulations and directives. See European Commission. European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations – Albania. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/
detailed-country-information/albania_en>.
134 See Venice Commission, 105th Plenary Session, 18-19 December 2015, Interim Opinion on the Draft Constitutional 
Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania at paras 9, 131, CDL-AD(2015)045-e, online: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2015)045-e; Venice Commission, 106th Plenary Session, 11-12 March 2016, Final Opinion on the Re-
vised Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania (15 January 2016) at para 71, CDL-AD(2016)009-e, at para 
71, online: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)009-e.
135 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. OAS Celebrates 20th Anniversary of the Inter-American Convention against Cor-
ruption. 24 mar. 2017. Available at: <http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=AVI-025/17>.
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Second, Brazilian political actors and the people must consider whether the 
answer to fighting judicial corruption rests in the creation of new public institutions or 
in the disinfection of its existing institutions. The answer in Albania was a combination 
of both. New institutions were created to oversee existing ones, and the existing ones 
were reconfigured with new safeguards against corruption. The risk with creating new 
institutions is that it will give corrupting influences new points of entry into the coun-
try’s judicial process and infrastructure. Yet the risk with leaving existing institutions in 
place with no new oversight body is that little might change.
The third question is one that the Brazilian case highlights more than any other: 
is liberal democracy itself the problem? The great paradox in Brazil is that the march to 
liberal democracy has given corrupting influences an argument and an accompanying 
vocabulary to limit any intrusion into the judiciary, and consequently to combat judicial 
corruption. The watchwords of modern liberal democracy are powerful constitutional 
and rhetorical barriers to actions that might violate the ‘separation of powers’ or ‘judicial 
independence’, even if those actions might be useful to achieving the end of curbing judi-
cial corruption in the larger service of democracy. The kinds of constitutional reforms that 
were recently introduced in Albania would be resisted in Brazil by corrupting influences 
both because they could possibly help fight corruption but also because they do indeed 
appear to compromise judicial independence and the separation of powers in the sense 
that the impose checks on what courts can do. And yet can there be any other way but 
introducing some oversight of courts—either internal or external—to fight corruption?
We have sought in this paper to explore a problem of huge proportions in Brazil: 
judicial corruption. In light of our experience as Consultants to the constitutional reform 
process in Albania just last year to address the very same problem of judicial corruption 
in that country, we have endeavored to explain the problem of judicial corruption in 
Albania and how political actors have tried to address it with far-reaching constitutional 
reforms. We have taken the further step of asking whether Albania’s recent constitutio-
nal reform holds any lessons for Brazil as it confronts its own quite serious challenges 
with judicial corruption. We have no answer as to whether Albania’s reforms could work 
in Brazil. We have instead outlined the Albanian strategy and moreover raised a series 
of modest questions that Brazilians must ask themselves if they wish to pursue meanin-
gful constitutional reform to finally curb judicial corruption.
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